116 replies to this topic

[davidm]

Timothy, it seems to me that you still misunderstand the central point here, as evidenced to me further by our discussion this evening in chat.

Keith is irrelevant.

I understand that Keith is in prison. I understand that lots of things can’t be done for lots of reasons. The argument that I am putting forth here is NOT attempting to establish Keith’s free will, or the free will of ANYONE. For all I know, we may all be wind-up robots and have no freedom other than to carry out a pre-determined program.

That is not what this discussion is about.

Basically, this discussion began, a long time ago, with a debate over the validity of logical determinism. Logical determinism, or fatalism, is the thesis that if it is true today that tomorrow x will happen, then there is no alternative but that x happens, and so therefore there cannot be free will.

This is Aristotle’s Sea Battle.

Again, my argument is very focused. It’s not that we have free will. It’s that, on the assumption that we lack free will, the reason for this lack is NOT logical determinism, or the Sea Battle Problem. We could lack free will for some other reason, but not THIS reason.

Take any general class of propositions:

Today it is true that tomorrow x will do y, therefore tomorrow necessarily x will do y.

The above is the argument to logical fatalism.

What we have seen (hopefully!) is that this construction commits a logical fallacy, the modal fallacy. Properly reconstructed, we get:

Necessarily (if today it is true that x will do y, then x will do y).

To be sure, if today it is true that tomorrow x will do y, he WILL do y. But his act is contingent and not necessary. On the theory that propositions are timelessly true (do not be come true “at a time,” when an event happens), then ANYTHING that happens tomorrow will have a true proposition describing it today. Thus, if tomorrow x refrains from doing y, then today it is true that tomorrow, x will refrain from doing y.

What we have established here is that nothing about the truth of a proposition today, rules out free will tomorrow. Free will of course may be ruled out for some other reason: That we are all windup robots or behind prison walls and can’t go to Hawaii. But it is not ruled out SOLELY in virtue of the fact that there are true propositions today about facts tomorrow, and it is THIS argument by the logical determinist that modal logic shows to be invalid. This modal logical analysis does not PROVE we have free will; it only proves free will is not ruled out by the truth today of contingent facts in the future. It may be ruled out for some other reason.

Now let’s look at Keith you keep bringing up.

Keith is in prison. He wants to go to Hawaii. Is it POSSIBLE for Keith to go to Hawaii, if he’s in prison?

Sure it is. When we talk about a “possible world” we mean a LOGICALLY possible world. Nothing about Keith going to Hawaii would cause a contradiction, so it’s possible that Keith will go to Hawaii. And we can even envision some plausible ways this happens: He escapes, he gets a pardon from the governor, a merciful guard opens his cell, etc. etc.

However, all other things being equal, we should expect that Keith WON’T go to Hawaii, and will stay in prison.

So what’s it mean?

Keith’s plight is just not relevant to the argument I’m making.

Cast in fallacious terms, as we have seen above, the argument is:

Today it is true that tomorrow Keith will stay in prison, therefore tomorrow necessarily Keith will stay in prison.

Recast in logically sound terms, the argument now becomes:

Necessarily (if today it is true that tomorrow Keith will stay in prison, then tomorrow Keith will stay in prison).

Now -- please attend to this, because it’s the whole heart of the matter -- all this reconstructed argument, once the modal fallacy is identified, hopes to show is this: that it is logically false to say that Kieth necessarily will stay in prison tomorrow, BECAUSE it happens to be true today that he will stay in prison tomorrow. Rather, it’s ONLY true today that Keith will stay in prison tomorrow, because in fact he will stay in prison. If in fact he scampered off to Hawaii, then today it is true that tomorrow he will scamper off to Hawaii.

Now, of course, in the loose, non-logical sense of the term “necessary,” Keith may find it “necessary” that he stay in prison tomorrow and not enjoy Hawaii. Too bad for Keith. But this is irrelevant. I’m not talking about whether Keith is behind walls or even in chains. Of COURSE walls and chains circumscribe freedom. I’m TALKING ABOUT whether Keith is in METAPHYSICAL CHAINS by virtue of the fact that there is already a true proposition describing his future acts before those acts unfold. If there ARE such metaphysical chains, then logical determinism shows that NO ONE is free and all acts are fated, and therefore your bringing up Keith is irrelevant. You might as well bring up Bob and his hat.

But once the modal fallacy is brought to light, the argument to logical determinism is shown to be false. So today it’s true that tomorrow Keith will stay in prison, but this truth is METAPHYSICALLY contingent. His actual circumstances are not relevant. All we are saying is that REGARDLESS of Keith’s actual circumstances, or ANYONE’s circumstances, we cannot say they lack free will JUST BECAUSE IT IS TRUE TODAY THAT TOMORROW THEY WILL DO X. Of course they may lack free will for some other reason (like being in prison!) but not for THAT reason -- the reason purported by logical determinism!

Once this argument is properly grasped (I can only hope!) it should be glaringly evident that Keith’s actual physical circumstances have NOTHING TO DO with my argument!

Edited by davidm, 22 March 2012 - 02:20 AM.

[davidm]

Timothy, on 22 March 2012 - 01:49 AM, said:

The following arose in chat. David said " If it's not necessary that x do y, it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-y" I am pointing out that this argument, if 'possible' refers to the existence of genuinely open alternatives, would FORCE us to the conclusion that Keith has the free will to leave his cell. The argument formally looks like this:

P1 If it's not necessary that (keith) do (stay), it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-(stay)

P2 it's not necessary that (keith) do (stay)

C it is possible for him to do not-(stay)

with 'possible' here meaning 'has genuine open options', that's an airtight case So we all know how this kind of logic works. You either attack the validity of the argument, showing that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, but this one is pretty clearly unassailable on that grounds. That leaves only two options: attack a premise, or accept the conclusion. There is literally nothing else that can be done. I therefore await Davids decision. For the record, I don't accept premise 2, because the sense in which it is 'possible' for Keith to not stay is NOT the same as him having a genuinely open option to do so. That in turn demonstrates that the sense of 'possible' that the modal argument relies on is talking about something entirely different from that which we require to analyse free will. And THAT means that when I make the case that the existence of a proposition about an event makes it 'impossible' for someone to do otherwise, it is not straightforwardly a modal fallacy. It would be, if I were using 'possible' in the same sense as davids argument above, but clearly I am not, I am talking about something we've just seen is entirely different, and so the modal fallacy does not apply. e: in case you're wondering dave, yes accepting the conclusion or attacking a premise ARE your only options here, and yes I am going to hound you for a decision.

Nope, you've completely misunderstood the argument, as I make clear in my previous post. I'll reiterate here.

All the argument I am talking about is that Keith is not necessitated to stay in prison by virtue of the fact that it's already true today, that tomorrow he will stay in prison. To be sure, tomorrow he may find it PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE to leave prison (or not!) but this is simply irrelevant. I am not concerned about whether Keith is forced to stay in prison because of walls and chains. I am ONLY concerned about whether he is forced to stay in prison because today it's already true that tomorrow he will stay in prison. The modal fallacy only shows that one cannot validly infer that Keith necessarily stays in prison tomorrow because it's true today that tomorrow he will stay in prison. It says NOTHING about walls and chains and those facts are irrlevant!

[davidm]

Timothy, on 22 March 2012 - 01:49 AM, said:

The following arose in chat.

David said " If it's not necessary that x do y, it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-y"

I am pointing out that this argument, if 'possible' refers to the existence of genuinely open alternatives, would FORCE us to the conclusion that Keith has the free will to leave his cell.

Hopefully argument by repetition can make the point.

We are NOT forced to the conclusion that Keith has the free will to leave his cell (thought it certainly is logically possible that he might do this). This is NOT the argument, it is a complete missing of the point.

The argument to logical determinism is this: That we are focred to conclude that Keith lacks free will, NOT because he is in chains, or behind bars or a wall, but rather because it's true today that tomorrow Keith will be in prison.

The logical determinist holds that BECAUSE it's true today that tomorrow Keith will be in prison, then NECESSARILY keith will be in prison tomorrow. This argument has NOTHING TO DO with the physical facts of walls or chains.

The designation of the modal fallacy flaw shows ONLY this: We cannot conclude that Keith NECESSARILY will be in prison tomorrow, in virtue of the fact that it's already true today that tomorrow he will be in prison. All we can logically conclude is: Necessarily (if it is true today that tomorrow Keith will be in prison, then he will be in prison.)

That's it! His ACTUAL condition is irrelevant to the logical argument under consideration. All we are showing is that BY ITSELF, a true proposition today about a future contingent does not ENTAIL or NECCESSITATE that contingent. Keith may be trapped for some other reason -- like walls or chains -- but his not METAPHYSICALLY unfree. And that is all that the argument is about! This is why Keith has never been relevant.

Edited by davidm, 22 March 2012 - 03:10 AM.

[davidm]

To sum up: I am only contesting the LOGICALLY FALSE claim that Keith will necessarily stay in prison tomorrow, SOLELY in virtue of the fact that it is already true today that tomorrow he will stay in prison. For, again, if that claim were true, then all acts are unfree and again we don't need to invoke Keith and his prison walls.

[davidm]

Timothy, just in case it's not already clear (and if it's not clear after all this, it never will be) you and I, for quite some time, have been talking about two different things. This is why I have always puzzled over your Keith analogy. I thought that Keith was supposed to represent a metaphysical analogy, because I thought we were talking about Aristotle's problem of future contingents. Because I thought this, I thought that Keith's prison walls, and chains, or whatever, were analogical, and intended to represent metaphysical walls and chains somehow imposed owing to the fact that there are true propositions about Keith's acts even before Keith acts, or tries to act. And this was what I have always been addressing, and pointing out that if this was your intention, you were committing the modal fallacy.

Of course, I recall that some time ago, you denied that Keith's plight was intended to analogical, and of course this only deepened my confusion.

My confusion is now cleared up. I am talking about the problem of future contingents, and you are talking about something else: whether, at a particular time, someone truly has free will in the face of constraints. And of course, I agree with you that sometimes our free will is balked by constraints; although one may point out that these constraints do not remove our free will per se, but merely prevent us from achieving what we set out to do. But failure does not mean we lack freedom, because we try and fail to do things all the time.

No, what I am talking about is a state of affairs at time 1 (t1) and you are talking about a different state of affairs at time2 (t2).

You are talking about the fact that at t2, Keith is in prison but wants to go to Hawaii. And absent some unlikely turn of events, I fully agree with you that Keith lacks the genuine option of going to Hawaii at t2.

But I am not talking about t2, and never have been. I am talking about t1.

I am talking about the following proposition: "At t1 it is true that at t2, Keith will stay in prison."

What I am talking about is this: Is it really true (as Aristotle feared) that, given the proposition, "At t1 it is true that at t2, Keith will stay in prison," it then follows that Keith MUST stay in prison? I am not concerned with whether it is true that Keith MUST stay in prison at t2 because he is surrounded by walls and guards and so on. I am concerned with whether Keith's freedom is already ruled out a priori, at t1, just owing to the fact that there is a true proposition today that describes what Keith will or won't do tomorrow.

Do you not see the difference?

Of course I understand that at t2, Keith might be compelled by circumstances to stay in prison, regardless of his desire to go to Hawaii. I don't care about that. What I care about is not whether he is compelled by circumstances, like walls and guards and chains, at t2 to stay in prison and forego Hawaii. What I am concerned to know is whether he is compelled to stay in prison even before t2 ever arrives, owing to the fact that at t1 there is a true proposition that says, at t2, Keith will stay in prison.

Do you not see the difference in what we are talking about?

The modal fallacy I keep invoking shows only that BY ITSELF, the fact that there is a true proposition at t1 about what Keith will do, not do, or try and fail to do, at t2, has no bearing on his free will. So Aristotle's worry that truth-valued future contingents entail fatalism later is without logical foundation. That's all I have tried to show. Nothing more. The chains and walls and whatnot at t2 certainly do have a bearing on limiting his freedom, but I don't care about t2. I only care about t1.

Do you not see now that we have been talking about different things?

What puzzles me is that it seems we were staring out talking about future contingents. So I again ask:

Do you, or do you not maintain, that the truth of a proposition today entails that the event described MUST happen tomorrow? That is the only question. It's why Keith is irrelevant. For instance, suppose that at t2, Keith decided to close his eyes, instead of leave his prison and go to Hawaii. Nothing about being in prison, at t2, precludes him closing his eyes, right? So the question to you is:

If it is true today at t1 that tomorrow at t2 Keith will close his eyes, then will it necessarily be the case that Keith closes his eyes? If that is the case, then Keith metaphysically lacks all free will, and the prison walls are especially irrelevant.

[Timothy]

Oh holy dammit. I just lost a huge post. Gluuurgh.

Alright though there were three main points I was making.

The first point was me apologising for promising a reply the same day and then vanishing for a month. I've been busy again but I am truly sorry, I know you were on form when I abandoned the discussion.

The second point was that I agree that we somehow seem to be talking past each other, but that I need you to understand that however much you feel that I am simply failing to see what you plainly type, the feeling is extremely mutual. In fact, I don't even understand what you think I'm saying with the Keith scenario, because I can't make head or tail of any of the ways you describe it. For my own part, you were good enough to ask a straightforward question: "Do you, or do you not maintain, that the truth of a proposition today entails that the event described MUST happen tomorrow?". So my answer, which is not straightforward, is: Yes, for a given value of "MUST". (edit: it will also seem to you that this post ignores much of what you have recently posted. I assure you I have read it in good faith, but I'm afraid it seems as irrelevant to me as my posts evidently seem to you)

The importance of working out exactly what 'must' means in the above is what I have been trying to make vlear by my keith analogy, which is also the third point I was trying to make.

And here it is again: if you respond to nothing else in this post, please respond to the section starting from here.

We both know that if you have a formal logical argument in front of you, you have three options and three options only, those being to dispute the arguments validity, to take issue with the truth value of one or more premises, or to accept the conclusion.

The argument before you is this:


P1 If it's not necessary that (x) do (y), it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-(y)
P2 it's not necessary that (x) do (y)
C it is possible for him to do not-(y)


Here there is no arguing over the premises, they are placeholders while we look at the validity. The above argument is how I have cast your statement and central thesis: " If it's not necessary that x do y, it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-y"

Do you find this to be a valid argument?

Moving on, and subbing in agents and actions:


P1 If it's not necessary that (bob) do (put hat on), it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-(put hat on)
P2 it's not necessary that (bob) do (put hat on)
C it is possible for him to do not-(put hat on)

In this argument, do you find either P1 or P2 to be untrue?


P1 If it's not necessary that (keith) do (stay), it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-(stay)
P2 it's not necessary that (keith) do (stay)
C it is possible for him to do not-(stay)

In this argument, do you find either P1 or P2 to be untrue?


I'm afraid I have to insist on you're answering the above three bolded questions.

Edited by Timothy, 15 April 2012 - 01:28 AM.

[Timothy]

P.S. if you detect any antagonistic tone here it's not for real honest.

Oh yeah and also you said:

Quote

My confusion is now cleared up. I am talking about the problem of future contingents, and you are talking about something else: whether, at a particular time, someone truly has free will in the face of constraints.

I'm really REALLY not talking about that at all. You should be able to see from the above what I do mean to say by keith, but I suppose to summarise my intention, I would say that I am trying to show, by applying the same logical argument you use to show that bob has free will to keith, that your ARGUMENT is flawed. I know you keep saying 'keith is different' and 'keith is irrelevant'. but your argument has to work for both bob and keith, when the differences in their situation are taken into account. That's what I've done in the above post. I KNOW Keiths situation is different from bobs, and that his whole scenario is totally different, but all of that is included in the logical arguments I've framed up. You will find that you can't make a consistent case for why the argument for bobs free will succeeds, but the same one for keith fails.

All of that said, the last part of the previous post is the thing you should be responding to. Hit up those bolded questions before you even finish this sentence, ok?

[davidm]

He's back!

Of course, all the arguments you reproduce above are valid and sound.

As to Keith, it's really unlikely he is going to do other than stay in prison, but "really unlikely" is NOT "necessarily impossible." There is really nothing else to say to that.

As to the problem of future contingents, I'm afraid I find your answer to be inadequate. In addition to trying again to invoke a murky "must" that is outside modal logic and has no logical basis, you really didn't answer my question -- or maybe you did, in a backhand way.

You want to focus on Keith, and I want to focus on Bob. So now my question to you:

If it is true today that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat, does Bob have to put on his hat? Does Bob lack free will?

I"ve already given you a covering case for both Keith and Bob. I am only interested in metaphysical necessity and contingency at t1, and any physical constraints (or the lack thereof) on free will at t2 are irrelevant.

Put another way, again: I am trying to understand whether you think that the truth of a proposition at t1, by itself, constrains free will at t2. That is all I am talking about, nothing else. If you think that the truth of a proposition at t1 by itself constrains free will, then surely you will come to see why all the constraints you impose on Keith at t2 don't mean anything for the purpose of this argument. For if at t1 Keith is ALREADY CONSTRAINED to do what he will do, by the prior truth of the proposition alone, then he necessarily won't -- can't -- go to Hawaii if he is in prison, but he ALSO necessarily won't -- can't -- go to Hawaii if he is home in bed and thinks, wrongly, that he is able to go to Hawaii if he wanted to. Surely you can see this?

Now, if you agree with me that the truth of a proposition at t1 does not BY ITSELF constrain future freedom, then we are in full agreement and the debate has ended.

Edited by davidm, 15 April 2012 - 05:41 PM.

[davidm]

Timothy, on 15 April 2012 - 01:25 AM, said:

iFor my own part, you were good enough to ask a straightforward question: "Do you, or do you not maintain, that the truth of a proposition today entails that the event described MUST happen tomorrow?". So my answer, which is not straightforward, is: Yes, for a given value of "MUST".

I think I understand what you are getting here, but I have to say again that it misses the mark.

You are saying that for a certain kind of "must" that falls short of logical necessity -- let us call it physical or nomological necessity, the latter being a favored term of philosophers for this state of affairs -- then the proposition, "Today it is true that tomorrow Keith will not go to Hawaii," does indeed entail that he will not go to Hawaii, given that he is in prison.

I wonder how I can make you see your mistake? It is not the prior truth of the proposition, given his future act, that prevents him from going to Hawaii -- it is not the fact ALONE that at t1, it is true that at t2 he will not go to Hawaii, that makes it be he will not go to Hawaii.

What makes it be that he will not go to Hawaii is that at t2, he is in prison.

[davidm]

Take the following proposition: "Today it is true that tomorrow, gravity will function according to the inverse square law."

Now gravity is in much worse shape than Keith. It has never, to the best of our knowledge, failed to function according to this mathematical description. We've no reason to believe that tomorrow it will suddenly function according to a different description.

But for the purposes of the problem of future contingents, it matters not a whit. The problem of future contingents asks a very simple question: Will gravity tomorrow necessarily function according to inverse square, BECAUSE AND ONLY BECAUSE it's true today that tomorrow, it will do that thing? And I deny that gravity will necessarily function on inverse square tomorrow BECAUSE AND ONLY BECAUSE it is true today that tomorrow it will do so. To be sure, if it is true today that tomorrow g will function on inverse square, it WILL do that thing; but it does not HAVE TO. If gravity somehow tomorrow began functioning on a different metric, then it would be true today that tomorrow gravity will function on that different metric.

That is all there is to it. Everything else is irrelevant.

Edited by davidm, 15 April 2012 - 04:54 PM.

[Timothy]

That's not where I'm going with this at all.

Okay, so I have you saying that all the arguments as I framed them are valid and sound.

My problem is that the conclusion of the argument for bob, that it is possible for him to do not-(put hat on), is what you are using to show that Bob has free will. Remember that your challenge (from years ago) is to demonstrate that the criteria for free will as posed by swartz are satisfied. You use this conclusion, that it is possible for bob to not put his hat on, to say that those criteria are satisfied. That is, since you've shown that it's "possible" that bob doesn't put on his hat, it follows that he has alternative options genuinely open to him.

Unfortunately, I have now shown, and you have accepted, that it is also "possible" for keith to leave his cell in the same way, and by the same logic as it is "possible" for bob not to put on his hat.

But this means that if I am to conclude that bob has 'not putting on his hat' as a genuinely open alternative on this ground, then so must we conclude that Keith has the genuinely open option to leave his cell. But this is not acceptable. The reason he can't leave his cell is, as you persistantly note, irrelevant, but it is a fact that he can't, and yet by the logic with which you have claimed to demonstrate bobs free will we are forced to conclude that it is one of his genuinely open alternative actions.

Yes, this means that there has to be some kind of murkiness in the definitions of 'must' 'possible' etc, but it is on your side, not mine. I after all am arguing that the ambiguity be clarified and delineated, to show that the word 'possible' when used in a many-worlds analysis does not reflect genuinely open alternatives (if it did, we have to say Keith has free will to leave his cell and other absurdities). You are the one whose case rests on keeping the definition of 'must' murky, presumably because your argument rests wholly on making a false equivalence between multiple senses of 'possible' which will no longer work if inspected too closely.

Edited by Timothy, 15 April 2012 - 09:58 PM.

[davidm]

Timothy, on 15 April 2012 - 09:57 PM, said:

That's not where I'm going with this at all. Okay, so I have you saying that all the arguments as I framed them are valid and sound. My problem is that the conclusion of the argument for bob, that it is possible for him to do not-(put hat on), is what you are using to show that Bob has free will. Remember that your challenge (from years ago) is to demonstrate that the criteria for free will as posed by swartz are satisfied. You use this conclusion, that it is possible for bob to not put his hat on, to say that those criteria are satisfied. That is, since you've shown that it's "possible" that bob doesn't put on his hat, it follows that he has alternative options genuinely open to him. [size=4][color=#282828][font=helvetica, arial, sans-serif]Unfortunately, I have now shown, and you have accepted, that it is also "possible" for keith to leave his cell in the same way, and by the same logic as it is "possible" for bob not to put on his hat.

No.

What we are trying to inquire is whether either Keith or Bob lacks free will, given that it is already true today, that tomorrow (Keith, Bob) will do (x,y)

What we are trying to find out is whether Swartz's criteria for free will are satisfied, on the assumption that there is a true proposition today, that describes a person's action tomorrow. If it turns out that the truth of a proposition today, rules out a free act tomorrow, then it just doesn't matter whether Keith is in prison or not. Whatever he does tomorrow, whether in prison or not, is already fated by the truth of the proposition that describes what he will/won't do tomorrow.

All am I trying to show is that the truth of a proposition today, by itself, does not rule out free will.

So again: If it is true today that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat, do you, or do you not believe, that the truth today of this proposition entails/necessitates that Bob put on his hat tomorrow?

[Timothy]

It doesn't necessitate it, but as I have shown with Keith, that does not mean we can say that he has alternative options genuinely available to him.

edit: and "that the truth of a proposition today, by itself, does not rule out free will." is not all you're trying to say, you're trying to say that an agent has alternative options genuinely open to him wherever his action is not necessary.

Edited by Timothy, 15 April 2012 - 10:20 PM.

[davidm]

You ARE maintaining now that Bod has no genuine options, if it's true today that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat. So we don't need to talk about Keith. What we need to talk about is WHY Bob lacks genuine options, given that it's true today that tomorrow he will put on his hat.

Today it's true that tomorrow, Bob will put on his hat. The modal fallacy occurs thus: "If today it's true that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat, then tomorrow Bob MUST put on his hat."

But you are denying that you are making the modal fallacy. Instead, you are insisting that while it's not necessary that he put on his hat, he has no other options genuinely available to him tomorrow, given that today it's true he'll put on his hat tomorrow.

And I don't want to get into this distinction between "necessity" and "no genuine options," because there is no need to disentangle them. The fact is, it's WRONG to say he has no genuine options, just as it's wrong to say he necessarily must put on his hat. He has TWO options: put on hat or not put on hat. What you persistently fail to notice is that -- since Bob's act supplies the truth grounds of the proposition describing it -- then whatever Bob does, there will be a true statement in advance describing what he does.

Bob can put on his hat, or not put on his hat. Those are his genuine options.

However, there is no possible world at which the following states of affairs obtain:

1. Today it is true that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat, and tomorrow Bob will not put on his hat.

2. Today it is true that tomorrow Bob will not put on his hat, and tomorrow Bob puts on his hat.

The zero probability that you think applies to Bob doing not-y given that he does y is mistaken. You cannot validly apply the probability estimate to the act alone. The only two states of affairs that have zero probability of happening, in this case, are the two propositions mooted immediately above, for the simple reason that true propositions are true by definition and cannot also be false.

Now, suppose I know, as God would, that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat. So what? This in no way entails that Bob lacks a genuine option to not put on his hat. It just means that if he does NOT put on his hat, then God would know THAT FACT in advance, instead of the fact that he WILL put on his hat. And we see now that future contingent propositions and God's foreknowledge are in exactly the same boat. God's foreknowledge, and the truth value of a proposition, are grounded by what Bob himself freely does. You would have it the other way around -- that God's foreknowledge, or the truth-valued future contingent proposition, grounds Bob's act. This is absurd as saying that the proposition "The sun will come up this morning at 6:05 a.m." forces the sun to come up at 6:05 a.m.!

Edited by davidm, 15 April 2012 - 11:22 PM.

[Timothy]

It's pretty clear that we do need to disentangle the distinction between "necessity" and "no genuine options,", because if I'm right, and there is a difference, then I am not making the modal fallacy when I talk about the latter.
I'll be happy to talk more about true propositions and genuine options, but I feel that the issue with necessity and genuine options is at the root of that issue as well.

[davidm]

Timothy, on 15 April 2012 - 11:38 PM, said:

It's pretty clear that we do need to disentangle the distinction between "necessity" and "no genuine options,", because if I'm right, and there is a difference, then I am not making the modal fallacy when I talk about the latter.
I'll be happy to talk more about true propositions and genuine options, but I feel that the issue with necessity and genuine options is at the root of that issue as well.

No, it is not, because it's irrelevant. Modally speaking, "no genuine options," which is a physical or nomological constraint, falls under the heading, "contingently true." That's it. End of logical story.

My point here is simply that Bob certainly does have GENUINE OPTIONS -- put on his hat or not put on his hat -- which is why we don't need to worry about the so-called distinction between "genuine options" and necessity/contingency. What you need to show is why he doesn't have genuine options. You won't be able to do it because it isn't true.

[davidm]

I'm going to take on more stab at summing this up. Although if past is prologue I don't except we'll see Timothy again for another month or so.

The distinction that you are making between metaphysical necessity and contingency on the one hand, and what you style as "genuine options" on the other hand, does not matter. It is irrelevant to the point.

To see why, let me try to make your case even stronger. Consider the following proposition: "Today it false that tomorrow, George will flap his arms and fly to the moon."

This implies that George has two choices: Either flap his arms and fly to the moon, or not flap his arms and not fly to the moon. The two choices are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

Now, the pertinent question is this: Given today that it is false that tomorrow, George will flap his arms and fly to the moon, is it necessarily false that he will do so, and more: Is it necessarily false --- this is important --- solely in virtue of the fact that there is a proposition today that accurately describes what George will fail to do tomorrow?

That is, will George fail to flap his arms and fly to the moon tomorrow, because it's already true today that he won't do that thing? And does the truth of this proposition, that he won't flap his arms and fly to the moon, by itself already rule out George flapping his wings and flying to the moon?

You claim that you recognize the modal fallacy, and deny that you are making it in scenarios like, because you insist that while the truth of a proposition today doesn't necessitate its instantiation tomorrow, still there are cases, like that of Keith, in which the subject has no genuine option to do other than what he will do.

Now in the case of George, it is certainly true that when the time comes to flap his arms and fly to the moon, he lacks a genuine option to perform that act, because it is physically impossible.

Of course, he is free to try to do it; true lack of free will would prohibit him from even trying. Yet we try and fail to do much more mundane things all the time, and I don't think anyone argues that these failures undermine free will.

But what you seem to be arguing is that even before Keith tries and fails to flap his arms and fly to the moon, his freedom is already ruled out by the fact that there is a true proposition describing his failure even before he fails. This is the whole nub of the matter, and why your so called "genuine options" in terms of how they function under physical constraint (Keith) or under the constraint of the laws of biology and physics (George) simply don't matter. If you think that they do matter, then you can't very well deny, as you have done, that Keith's plight was simply a metaphor (as I took it) for the following state of affairs: Because there is a true proposition today, describing someone's act tomorrow, then that act will be what it is, not because of metaphysical necessity, but because the truth of a proposition today already rules out genuine options of the act being other than what it will be. Is this not your position? It must be your position; otherwise I no longer even know what you are arguing, and perhaps you don't either.

In the case of George, bearing in mind that "possible worlds" describes logically possible states of affairs, it remains logically possible that he flap his arms and fly to the moon, because the proposition describing this act instantiates no logical contradiction. However, speaking physically, or nomologically, it is nomologically impossible that he will do so because to do so would violate everything we know about biology and physics. So of course there is a distinction between necessity and contingency on the one hand, and genuine options on the other, which distinction I have never denied, and which distinction is abundantly evident in the case of George.

Again, however, the problem is you seem to think that the truth of a proposition in advance of the act it describes by itself rules out "genuine options" for the person undertaking the act. This has to be your position, because if it isn't, then I don't know what we've been arguing about. But if it is your position, then the whole thing about Keith has a been a red herring. We now can return to Bob and forget about Keith in prison or George trying to fly to the moon. We have a mundane act: Bob will either put on his hat or not put on his hat. He's perfectly free to do both.

I say if it's true today that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat, two claims follow that are both true: 1), that it is not necessary that Bob will do this, merely contingent; and 2) Bob, at the time of deciding whether to put on his hat, has the genuine option to refrain from doing so. As nearly as I can tell, the disagreement between us lies in the fact that while you agree with 1), you disagree with 2). Is that not correct?

If it is correct, you are mistaken about disagreeing with 2) I think this is the whole heart of the dispute. Your thinking seems to be: if it is already true before Bob decides to put on his hat or not, that he will put on his hat, then how can he do other than put on his hat?

And the mistake is twofold. I've described them before, but no reason not to waste my breath and wear out my typing fingers for the umpteenth time.

First, you forget what makes it true that Bob puts on his hat. You've already admitted that the truth of the proposition by itself doesn't make Bob put on his hat. How can a proposition about what I will do, make me do that thing? It's absurd. It's like saying the proposition "The sun will come up this morning at 6:10 a.m." makes the sun rise at that precise moment. And you say you agree with this. So: You agree that Bob's act is not necessary (hence avoiding the modal fallacy) and you say you agree that the proposition describing what Bob will do, does not and indeed cannot force him to do that thing.

So, Timothy, what does in fact, make it be true, that Bob puts on his hat??


Surely you must see that there is only one option left: Bob makes it be true that he puts on his hat. Bob putting on his hat is why there is a true proposition, before the fact, describing what Bob will do.

Your second mistake, of course, is to think that Bob should be able, if he is truly free, to get some sort of do-over. That is, given the truth of the proposition "today it is true that tomorrow Bob will put on his hat," it should be the case, if Bob is truly free, that he be able to cheat fate and not put on his hat.

This is absurd, if you will but give it some serious thought. Since it is BOB HIMSELF who makes "put on hat" true, and "not put on hat" false, how in the world is Bob supposed to do other than what he freely does? You are asking that Bob both put on his hat and not put on his hat -- a logical impossibility.

After all, Timothy -- think about it! Suppose Bob doesn't put on his hat tomorrow. In that case, the statement today would read, "Today it is true that tomorrow, Bob won't put on his hat." How could it be otherwise? You confusedly think that Bob lacks a genuine option of not putting on his hat. He HAS that option. The option that he lacks is to do something other than what a true statement describes, because true statements are definitionally true. This is a tautological truth. You would have it that Bob has the mystical ability to do something other what what a true statement describes. This is logically impossible. But Bob can either put on his hat or not. Whatever he does, though, there will be a true descriptor and Bob can't evade that descriptor.

I really don't think there is anymore I can say about this.

Edited by davidm, 17 April 2012 - 05:41 PM.