120 replies to this topic

[Inzababa]

Big Blooming Blighter, on 14 March 2012 - 03:39 PM, said:

It's not so much an assumption as a reasoned inference.

Ax is a universal quantifier. It was created specifically for that purpose. To state 'Ax denotes that for all x or for any given x' is no more an assumption than to state 'The letter B is the letter B' or 'The colour red is not blue'.

But no, I'm tired of this, we'll ask the bloody questions.

Give us an axiom, or an argument, in predicate format, using modal logic if you wish, that demonstrates your grasp of logic. Use predicate format and the English vernacular to facilitate your demonstration.

I did, there's a contradiction in the phrase.

quote from earlier post :

Quote

Yeah it was me, because I see a possible contradiction in this phrase :


Quote


All a "possible world" means in this context is that some state of affairs may possibly exist provided that the state of affairs in question does not bring about a logical contradiction

Rather than ask me why I thought so there was a contradiction, you "character assassinated", maybe YOU will learn something from this.


This was the question and number one priority of the OP :


Quote


Quote
making a distinction between kinds of 'possible'



You think there are different kinds of possible or not?

[davidm]

Well, pull 'em out then, at least until Timothy shows up again the main topic is dormant!

[Inzababa]

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:02 PM, said:

Well, pull 'em out then, at least until Timothy shows up again the main topic is dormant!

this is the main topic as stipulated by the OP :



Quote


Quote
making a distinction between kinds of 'possible'



We don't have to wait for him to come back.

You think there are different kinds of possible?

Why?

or

Why not?

I think there are.

[davidm]

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:03 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:02 PM, said:

Well, pull 'em out then, at least until Timothy shows up again the main topic is dormant!

this is the main topic as stipulated by the OP :



Quote


Quote
making a distinction between kinds of 'possible'



We don't have to wait for him to come back.

You think there are different kinds of possible?

Why?

or

Why not?

I think there are.

I"ve already addressed this issue numerous times in this thread, including see directly above your quoted material in this very post.

Edited by davidm, 14 March 2012 - 04:09 PM.

[Big Blooming Blighter]

Of course there are, because there are different scopes.

In this, the actual world, it is not possible that JFK is the President of the US. This is a fact based on historical and political states of affairs.

In some other possible world, JFK was not assassinated, was extraordinarily fortunate, and still reigns to this day.

I like to distinguish these types of possibilia as 'localised possibilia' (things that are or are not possible given the way things are in the actual world) and 'modal possibilia' (things that are true in one or more possible worlds).

The actual world (unless you're an extreme modal realist) is this world. All other worlds are non-actual, yet possible.

If you are an extreme modal realist, then all worlds are actual, and we distinguish this world by simply saying 'this world'.

Then we can get into schemas, and worlds where certain maximal sets of propositions hold true, but that's irrelevant. The whole notion of 'different kinds of possible' is irrelevant, of course, because the fact that a bachelor is unmarried (and the other axioms we threw your way) is necessarily true under all scopes of standards of possibility.

A possible world, just to clear this up, is a maximal set of logically consistent propositions.

[davidm]

Yeah, but he'd be 95 years old!

[Inzababa]

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world", and here we are, is it possible to define the actual world without knowing about the actual world? Because even though we may know a lot about it, we certainly are far from knowing "most" of it aren't we?


For example, to apply logic to this assumes that the "actual world" is logical.

Doesn't it?

That may seem obviously true (that the actual world is logical) however, can we prove it?

I don't think so. So unless that point is included in the logic itself, for example :

Ax refers to an actual world which may not be logical (because we can't prove it).



Also, because it is an abstraction, it by definition, necessarily, tautologically, is a derivation.

Isn't it?

Which means that there always is something "missing" when an abstraction is used by principle, as a matter of definition. That needs to be included as well, almost as if it were self defining. (like we are).

Unless that point is integrated within the abstraction itself, I can't see how anything that may be concluded from it will ever be "tautolically" true.

[davidm]

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:15 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world"...

No, full stop, before going on, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said.

"Possible' refers to actual and non-actual worlds both. That is why I rather specifically said, "possible but non-actual." The only other kinds of non-actual worlds are worlds that are necessarily false and cannot be actual in any possible circumstances.

[Inzababa]

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:18 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:15 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world"...

No, full stop, before going on, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said.

"Possible' refers to actual and non-actual worlds both. That is why I rather specifically said, "possible but non-actual." The only other kinds of non-actual worlds are worlds that are necessarily false and cannot be actual in any possible circumstances.

ok, so for you "all of what is universally absolutely true" and exists (basically, everything that can be "absolutely")

is part of one world or another.

So you see "the world" as two separate worlds, with one being actual and the other being not actual, is that right?

See, that's the "pillar" on which your perspective stands.

I'm not disputing it, I'm trying to understand your perspective.

[Big Blooming Blighter]

He knows logic!

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:24 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:18 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:15 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world"...

No, full stop, before going on, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said.

"Possible' refers to actual and non-actual worlds both. That is why I rather specifically said, "possible but non-actual." The only other kinds of non-actual worlds are worlds that are necessarily false and cannot be actual in any possible circumstances.

ok, so for you "all of what is universally absolutely true" and exists (basically, everything that can be "absolutely")

is part of one world or another.

So you see "the world" as two separate worlds, with one being actual and the other being not actual, is that right?

See, that's the "pillar" on which your perspective stands.

I'm not disputing it, I'm trying to understand your perspective.

NO!

NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO

FUCKING NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO!

[davidm]

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:24 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:18 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:15 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world"...

No, full stop, before going on, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said.

"Possible' refers to actual and non-actual worlds both. That is why I rather specifically said, "possible but non-actual." The only other kinds of non-actual worlds are worlds that are necessarily false and cannot be actual in any possible circumstances.

ok, so for you "all of what is universally absolutely true" and exists (basically, everything that can be "absolutely")

is part of one world or another.

So you see "the world" as two separate worlds, with one being actual and the other being not actual, is that right?

No.

[davidm]

Worth a read: Possible Worlds.

[davidm]

The short version: Supplementary Notes for Possible Worlds.

Edited by davidm, 14 March 2012 - 04:52 PM.

[davidm]

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:24 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:18 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:15 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world"...

No, full stop, before going on, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said.

"Possible' refers to actual and non-actual worlds both. That is why I rather specifically said, "possible but non-actual." The only other kinds of non-actual worlds are worlds that are necessarily false and cannot be actual in any possible circumstances.

ok, so for you "all of what is universally absolutely true" and exists (basically, everything that can be "absolutely")

is part of one world or another.

So you see "the world" as two separate worlds, with one being actual and the other being not actual, is that right?

See, that's the "pillar" on which your perspective stands.

I'm not disputing it, I'm trying to understand your perspective.

Briefly, "possible worlds," the realm of possibilia, encompass the actual world. The actual world is a subset of possible worlds. There are an infinite number of ways that the world could have been, but only one way that it actually is (unless one is a modal realist.)

However, propositions that describe contradictory states of affairs are necessarily false and cannot hold at any possible world. And, propositions that are necessarily true, such as, for example, 2+2=4, are true at all possible worlds, the actual and the nonactual.

So, where do we go now?

Edited by davidm, 14 March 2012 - 05:01 PM.

[Inzababa]

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 05:00 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:24 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:18 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 04:15 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 04:06 PM, said:

To reiterate, in the possible worlds terminology we are using, "possible" just refers to that which brings about no logical contradiction. So a married bachelor is not possible. In fact, the proposition "there are married bachelors" is necessarily false at all possible worlds.

That which is not logically contradictory is possibly true. Nevertheless, most possible truths are not actual truths. It is possible that there be winged pigs for talking donkeys, but they do not exist in the actual world. At this point it might be worth noting that modal realists believe that "actuality" is an indexical, like "here" and "now." Such modal realists, like David Lewis, maintain that all logically possible worlds are are actual worlds, so there is an actual world, for instance, with talking donkeys, just not the world that we call "actual."

Therefore propositions are possibly true or possibly false unless they are necessarily true or necessarily false. From this we derive the conclusion that the actual world consists of all the possible worlds that are actually instantiated, whereas there are a vast number of possible but non actual worlds.

So for you "possible" refers to the "actual world"...

No, full stop, before going on, that is not what I said. It is the opposite of what I said.

"Possible' refers to actual and non-actual worlds both. That is why I rather specifically said, "possible but non-actual." The only other kinds of non-actual worlds are worlds that are necessarily false and cannot be actual in any possible circumstances.

ok, so for you "all of what is universally absolutely true" and exists (basically, everything that can be "absolutely")

is part of one world or another.

So you see "the world" as two separate worlds, with one being actual and the other being not actual, is that right?

See, that's the "pillar" on which your perspective stands.

I'm not disputing it, I'm trying to understand your perspective.

Briefly, "possible worlds," the realm of possibilia, encompass the actual world. The actual world is a subset of possible worlds. There are an infinite number of ways that the world could have been, but only one way that it actually is (unless one is a modal realist.)

However, propositions that describe contradictory states of affairs are necessarily false and cannot hold at any possible world. And, propositions that are necessarily true, such as, for example, 2+2=4, are true at all possible worlds, the actual and the nonactual.

So, where do we go now?

That depends.

I don't see the world as having anything that "encompasses" or "subsets".

See? We're looking at the same thing in different ways ; hence mis communication.

In the world as I see it, logic doesn't apply, not the one your using.

Any description of an objective state tautologically relies first and foremost on the perspective used when "observing", which has a huge impact on things that you may not even be aware of.

For example,  can you think of anything which you can describe in such a way that has reflexive properties? (anything).

The reason I ask is because anything that is abstract is fundamentally based on axioms which do have those properties to begin with.

[Inzababa]

Quote

2+2=4,

is only true in "your" world. Not in mine.

For example, in my world :

2 men + 2 women "functioning" together = more than the function of 1 man + 1 man + 1 woman + 1 woman

In my world, everything depends not on what things are but on what they do. And because no thing that I can observe actually does the same thing at any two points in time, nothing is ever identical, nothing is ever reflexive, and 2 + 2 as you see it, doesn't exist except when absolutely defined in the first place.

Quote

So, where do we go now?

well, where do you want to go?

Edited by Inzababa, 14 March 2012 - 06:53 PM.

[DaveT]

It doesn't matter how one describes it, or what is added together, 2 + 2 = 4. One can say, "Ah, but if I have 2 children, and add to them 2 live grenades, what do I have? I don't have 4 children, nor do I have 4 live grenades; I have 2 children, and 2 live grenades, but not 4 of either," and that is almost true, except that we still have 4 things. 2 things plus 2 things (whether similar or completely different) equals 4 things.

Of course, in the above example, we soon end up with no things. Nothing. Zero. Etc.

2 men + 2 women can equal a lot of things. 2 men and 2 women, increased productivity, an orgy, a heated (possibly violent) dispute, etc; however, whatever comes of it, the result of putting them together is that we have 4 people together. 2 people + 2 people, whatever their age or gender, makes 4 people.

For basic logic, axioms, 2 and 2 equaling 4, etc. to be not true in your world, the only possible explanation is that you inhabit not only a different world to every single object inhabiting planet Earth, but a different world to everything that exists in this universe. You are somehow communicating to us from a different universe, or maybe even a different dimension or reality, one in which the rules of science, language, and philosophy do not apply. It seems you live in a reality in which the word "bachelor" was either coined to mean, "A married man," or to mean something completely unrelated to marriage in any shape or form. Perhaps in your world, a "bachelor," is some form of raucous, risible rock, or a malevolent mushroom; I wouldn't know. Can raucous, risible rocks and malevolent mushrooms marry in your reality? I ask, because if such a thing is completely impossible, then your objection to "There are no married bachelors" becomes even more astounding.

Edited by DaveT, 14 March 2012 - 07:17 PM.

[Big Blooming Blighter]

Are we trying to further a conversation with someone who can't even start with reflexivity and self-evident statements?

Epictetus, amongst many, many others would not have bothered to address this pompous, obtuse fool and I put it to the rest of you that we take a leaf from his book.

[davidm]

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 06:52 PM, said:

Quote

2+2=4,

is only true in "your" world. Not in mine.

If 2+2 does not equal 4 in your world, then I hope your world has plenty of working sedatives and strong orderlies who can put things right when the inmates try to take over the asylum.

If you don't concede the truth of 2+2=4, I don't see any productive discussion emerging.

[Inzababa]

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 08:21 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 06:52 PM, said:

Quote

2+2=4,

is only true in "your" world. Not in mine.

If 2+2 does not equal 4 in your world, then I hope your world has plenty of working sedatives and strong orderlies who can put things right when the inmates try to take over the asylum.

If you don't concede the truth of 2+2=4, I don't see any productive discussion emerging.

What you hope is irrelevant, as long as it doesn't in my world, then there is a problem with your phrase, it's not true "absolutely", or it would be "in my world".

And if you think that's because "my world" is not logical, then that proves that what you say is wrong, the assumption that the world is tautologically logical.

For how could something absolutely logical (which would mean its deterministic) produce something not logical which actually is a part of that world in the first place? Even if "what is not logical" is how I perceive the world.

Think about it.


And as long as you reject the eventuality, the potential, the possibility, the chance that what your assumptions are are wrong, there is no way of communicating on this kind of issue.

I'm not trying to say what I say is true, I'm trying to say that what you say "may" be wrong, and as long as you stand on that as if it were some absolute, everything else which you think and deduce may be wrong as well without you even knowing it.

Unless you have the humility to criticise your own reasoning, you won't get any where fast.

And the OP is talking to a brick wall.

On that note, I'm fed up with being insulted, by the way I thought you put me on ignore?

Thing is, I can't and won't insult you back since that will just lead me to get banned (again).

Kids do that, fox news does that, the jerry springer show does that. Civilised people do that (check signature).

Was hoping this wasn't the case on this forum.

If anyone knows of a place where people actually talk and listen to each other, without flaming and insulting and resorting to character assassination and mockery whenever someone says something they don't understand or don't agree with, send me a pm thanks.

[Big Blooming Blighter]

Has it not occurred to you why you keep getting banned, cretin?

[DaveT]

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 09:25 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 08:21 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 06:52 PM, said:

Quote

2+2=4,

is only true in "your" world. Not in mine.

If 2+2 does not equal 4 in your world, then I hope your world has plenty of working sedatives and strong orderlies who can put things right when the inmates try to take over the asylum.

If you don't concede the truth of 2+2=4, I don't see any productive discussion emerging.

Fixed.

Edited by DaveT, 14 March 2012 - 09:29 PM.

[davidm]

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 09:25 PM, said:

davidm, on 14 March 2012 - 08:21 PM, said:

Inzababa, on 14 March 2012 - 06:52 PM, said:

Quote

2+2=4,

is only true in "your" world. Not in mine.

If 2+2 does not equal 4 in your world, then I hope your world has plenty of working sedatives and strong orderlies who can put things right when the inmates try to take over the asylum.

If you don't concede the truth of 2+2=4, I don't see any productive discussion emerging.

What you hope is irrelevant, as long as it doesn't in my world, then there is a problem with your phrase, it's not true "absolutely", or it would be "in my world".

No, you only THINK 2+2 fails to equal four in your world. In reality it does. And the Blighter already explained all this in formal terms with respect to the proposition, "There are no married bachelors," so I direct you attention to that post for further edification.

[Timothy]

davidm, on 10 March 2012 - 12:32 AM, said:

You say Keith and Bob are disanalogous but then you contradict yourself by demanding that any free will argument I provide for Bob must also go through for Keith. But this isn't so. From a purely logical standpoint, what Keith ends up not doing, and what Bob ends up not doing, count as "possible but non-actual worlds." Again, when we inquire WHY these worlds are non-actual, we discover that Keith is in prison! What prison is  Bob in that he can't do other than put on his hat?

Again, I invite you to answer the question: Why can't Bob refrain from putting on his hat?

I've already told you why I'm not answering that question (Edit: although I answer it anyway at the end of this post). My problem is with your logic.

You say you don't need your argument to go through Keith, but what we see is that when it DOES go through Keith, Keiths free will or lack of free will is not established. Does Keith have free will? The modal argument which is supposed to answer this can not tell us, we must look elsewhere, find that he is physically restrained to the point where he doesn't have free will, completely outside of the modal argument.

So the problem is that just as the argument can not establish Keiths free will or lack of it, it can't establish Bobs free will or lack of it. We have to look outside the argument again, ask if there is anything restricting his options list.

This is now very plain. You challenge for me to find something that might stop bob putting on his hat, just as you have found something that stops Keith going to Hawaii. But the thing that stops Keith having free will is NOT arrived at by the modal argument you've been making. You've de-facto admitted that the arguments for Keith and Bob are identical, and then find something totally separate that allows you to say that Keith has no free will (the fact of his imprisonment).

So yeah, you're right that there's nothing in Bobs case that obviously restricts his free will, where there is an obvious thing restricting Keiths free will. However in neither case does your modal argument DEMONSTRATE free will. The conclusion "therefore X has free will" does not follow from the premises in either of the two arguments as I formulated them in my last post. If it did follow, then A. you would not NEED to ask 'what restricts bob's free will' because your argument would be already made, and B. it would also work for Keith just as well.

And just to clarify, since you have been for several years now the one claiming to demonstrate that free will and eternalism are compatible, it is very much the case that any argument you make that claims to demonstrate this must go through both Bob and Keith. Specifically, the argument must conclude that Bob has free will, and the same argument must conclude that Keith does NOT have free will. Surely you can see that? I'd like you to answer directly whether you think your modal argument has done that.

Or getting even closer to the way this debate was originally framed: you made the case that arguing from the FACT of bobs future action, to the conclusion that bob MUST perform that action commits the modal fallacy. I am arguing that by the exact same logic, arguing from the fact of Keiths future action to the conclusion that Keith MUST perform that action similarly commits the same fallacy. I honestly don't see how you can escape that conclusion, and I would like you to answer directly what you think about that.

That is, I want a straight answer to the following:
"In the future, Keith will stay in his cell, therefore he MUST stay in his cell" - this statements commits the modal fallacy. Yes/no.

I would answer 'yes', which leads me to the obvious problem that I have just applied a metric that purports to demonstrate free will, to an agent in a situation where he demonstrably does not have free will, and got the wrong answer. What happened?

Edit: as a demonstration of goodwill, I'll give a straight answer to the question YOU keep asking i.e. 'what stops bob putting on his hat'. To answer honestly, I can't think of anything that should do this. Nothing should be preventing Bob from performing any number of actions. However I still need some metric by which to populate a list of genuinely open alternatives for Bob, and this metric, when applied to Keith, must NOT generate alternatives. As best I can see, you are attempting to populate Bobs list with options on the grounds that they are contingent as opposed to necessary. I can't accept that because Keiths list would also then be populated.

Edited by Timothy, 21 March 2012 - 10:48 PM.

[Timothy]

The following arose in chat.

David said " If it's not necessary that x do y, it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-y"

I am pointing out that this argument, if 'possible' refers to the existence of genuinely open alternatives, would FORCE us to the conclusion that Keith has the free will to leave his cell.

The argument formally looks like this:

P1 If it's not necessary that (keith) do (stay), it follows by definition that it is possible for him to do not-(stay)

P2 it's not necessary that (keith) do (stay)

C it is possible for him to do not-(stay)

  
with 'possible' here meaning 'has genuine open options', that's an airtight case

So we all know how this kind of logic works. You either attack the validity of the argument, showing that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, but this one is pretty clearly unassailable on that grounds. That leaves only two options: attack a premise, or accept the conclusion. There is literally nothing else that can be done. I therefore await Davids decision.

For the record, I don't accept premise 2, because the sense in which it is 'possible' for Keith to not stay is NOT the same as him having a genuinely open option to do so. That in turn demonstrates that the sense of 'possible' that the modal argument relies on is talking about something entirely different from that which we require to analyse free will. And THAT means that when I make the case that the existence of a proposition about an event makes it 'impossible' for someone to do otherwise, it is not straightforwardly a modal fallacy. It would be, if I were using 'possible' in the same sense as davids argument above, but clearly I am not, I am talking about something we've just seen is entirely different, and so the modal fallacy does not apply.


e: in case you're wondering dave, yes accepting the conclusion or attacking a premise ARE your only options here, and yes I am going to hound you for a decision.

Edited by Timothy, 22 March 2012 - 01:53 AM.