Personally, I feel as though aphorisms are pedagogically useful. You mention philosophers like Heraclitus and Nietzsche who wrote aphoristically, and intern often misunderstood; however, I find more stimulating discourse surrounding these figures than those of whom write in the more traditional essay style.
If you take a style of writing like essay writing, you have a set of premises which lead to a conclusion, or conclusions depending on the essay, though, by and large, the reader will either agree or disagree and intern write another essay. However, if you look at the discourse that surrounds philosophers that have an aphoristic style of writing, you will also find essays on the works of these philosophers, though, there is a particular appeal, a certain kind of influence that these philosophers hold over their readers. I find the works of Heraclitus and Nietzsche rich and lasting.
I think what is interesting, however, is though these figures could be regarded as canonical, they do dwell out there on the fringes of canonical texts. This may seem a little absurd knowing the influence these philosophers have on so many others, though I think that they both reside and don't reside within the traditional scheme of Western philosophy.
If you really want to break it down one can provide definitions of both Λόγοϛ [logos] and Λέξιϛ [lexis]:
Λόγοϛ [logos]: a word, speech, language, eloquence; an oration, discourse; a saying, proverb; fame, report, rumour, talk; thought, opinion, conception, reflection; reason, understanding, sense; proportion, analogy; account, cause, reason; a computation, reckoning; a matter, point, purpose; an appearance, show, pretence; a volume, book, treatise; a narrative, story, fable.
Λέξιϛ [lexis]: a word, saying; a speech, oration, pleading, eloquence; style, expression, diction; a reading, glossary, paraphrase, language.
Both words at some point have moved beyond the definitions of the other; however, both words have their origins in the word λέγω [l
Heidegger's Being and Time marked a progression from the Cartesian notion of subject and object. With this subject/object relation we have an internal and external world (res cogitan and res extensa). In your 'second distinction' you illustrate the difference between "inner" and "outer" language. Here one can quite easily see a correlation with internal and external, and "inner" and "outer".
I'm in no way suggesting that the quote I referred to wasn't quite basic and understandable, however, this basic understanding is only in relation to a tradition of metaphysical language that carries baggage. You describe "outer language" referring to the "external world". Is this "external world" external to the world in which we exist and have a primordial familiarity with?
In light of Heidegger's inversion of the tradition, I ask if it is still necessary to use language to illustrate language used to describe a world in which we exist as being-there-in-the-world, and have a primordial familiarity with? Any such use of language is ultimately detached from the world being described whereby metaphor has no existential significance. The Cartesian assertion lies in the baggage associated with a tradition of metaphysics and metaphysical language.
the self is the only being with which being is an issue. as being is an issue for the self (Heidegger would later term this dasein), the self has to interrogate itself in order to take a stand on what it is to be a self. the self is always-already in a relation with itself interrogating itself in order to take a stand on its being for the sake of projecting itself into the future.
this, i think, is a fundamental aspect of kierkegaard's philosophy. a christian is not a christian because the culture demands it or because that christian's family are christians. the christian takes a stand on what it is to be a christian as an individual, not because it is the faith of the crowd. kierkegaard was a christian because he was always-already in a relationship with himself, interrogating himself, taking a stand on his being as a christian. kierkegaard was the knight of faith
Just to begin, I think I wrote that the self is not essentially rational, however, that is neither here nor there.
I know that Kant accepts that the self isn't completely rational, hence the CI, though if we are to base morality on reason then seemingly we don't need the numerous formulations of the CI. One question that needs to be asked is on what basis does Kant hold that human beings are essentially rational? Is it because we are rational animals? Reason is a faculty humans seem to have over and above other sentient beings, however, to same faculty of reason is employed to suggest that reason is not the essence of our character. It is only instrumental to suggest that our essential qualitative substance is reason, not intrinsic. What needs to be realised is that Kant is still operating on a tradition of metaphysics that holds subjects over objects, substances with predicates and with this in mind Kant is going to use the same language of metaphysics to outline his moral philosophy. If one looks at the phenomena, one ought to find that morality is not idealism, it is practical. We deal with others, and maybe even care for them, no amount of idealism can provide an adequate formulation of morality.
If we suppose, as you suggest, that the CI is for the weak willed could we then suggest that Nietzsche is correct in his criticism of Kant's moral philosophy, and if so, do we indeed have a master and slave morality?
You are right in saying that it is all speculative but it does make for great forum discussion.
Again, thanks for the welcome the site looks great!
The problem with Kant's CI, as I see it, is that the language of the CI alienates the self from the self. Language represents a fundamental coping with entities with which the self is the source of such representations. If we have the self as moral giver, we have, (sufficiently), the self as the source for which language represents these morals. In expressing morality as an imperative, the self imposes an obligation on the self to act in accordance with the imperative. For Kant, morality is based on a standard of rationality; however, the self is not essentially rational. For the self to be ultimately rational would require all of the self's representations of the world to be rational.
The obligatory language that represents these morals [sufficiently] fosters guilt and anxiety in the self due to the self's already irrational representation of the world, ultimately alienating the self (immoral agent) from the self (moral agent). If the self is not essentially rational, seemingly, the self is unable to impose morality on itself as duty by which rationality stands as morality's foundation (as Kant would have it).