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Rexia Bytheweil

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About Rexia Bytheweil

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    TGL Apprentice
  • Birthday 02/29/1984

Rexia Bytheweil's Activity

  1. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Berkeley's argument that an object cannot exist without the mind   


    Geoff, I'm just wondering, why do you not accept the second premise and simply assert that an object means something else? Surely the question is, given those premises, whether all else follows.
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  2. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Berkeley's argument that an object cannot exist without the mind   


    Here's another argument from Berkeley:

    (1) All ideas are inert
    (2) Inert things are not causes
    (3) An object is a compound of ideas, hence an object is inert.
    (4) An object is not a cause (of our sensations)
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  3. Rexia Bytheweil added a topic in Explore   

    Berkeley's argument that an object cannot exist without the mind
    mmFor what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive, besides our own ideas or sensations, and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?

    (1) All ideas or sensations cannot exist without the mind.
    (2) An object is a compound of sensations or ideas.
    (3) An object cannot exist without the mind.

    This is to say that it is a condition that the mind perceives for there to be an object. Any thoughts on Berkeley’s argument?
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  4. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Idea: Fitch's paradox of knowability   


    A formal definition, pg?

    Let K be the knowledge operator. Let  be the possibility operator.

    Then,

    that there is an unknown truth = p (p & ~Kp)
    that there is an unknowable truth = p (p & ~Kp)

    For an informal definition, let an unknown truth be a truth that we do not know. For example, that there is water on Mars could be a truth that we do not know. Let an unknowable truth be a truth that we cannot know. For example, that God created the universe could be a truth that we cannot know.

    The question does seem to be whether or not all unknown truths are knowable. In SEP, the authors of the entry on Fitch’s paradox claim that we can prove, independently of the paradox, that some unknown truth is not knowable. So, not all unknown truths are knowable.

    If we reflect on the history of science, or, even on our personal life, we see that we have come to know truths that we previously did not know. Only if unknown truths were knowable could we have come to know truths that we did not know before.

    Some unknown truths are therefore knowable, even if not all unknown truths are knowable. Sorry to seem going around in circles! I think there must be more, but it is difficult to get out of this loop.
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  5. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Idea: Fitch's paradox of knowability   

    Thanks, pg. I tried to explain the problem again, see below.

    Commonsense tells us that if a proposition is unknown, it does not follow that it is unknowable. Common sense also tells us that if all truths are knowable, it does not follow that all truths are known. Just because something is possible to know does not imply that it is already known.

    However, according to SEP, Frederic Fitch held that we can logically prove that there is an unknown truth entails that there is an unknowable truth. Its contraposition is the controversial thesis that all truths are knowable entails that all truths are known.

    In SEP, the authors assume that all truths are knowable and that there is an unknown truth, and show that it leads to a contradiction. The contradiction implies the need to deny that there is an unknown truth, from which it follows that all truths are known.

    I
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  6. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Idea: Fitch's paradox of knowability   

    Thanks, pg and parsec.

    I am studying the formulation of Fitch
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  7. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Idea: Fitch's paradox of knowability   

    I'm having trouble, though, moving from the inference that

    (1) p is known and it is known that p is unknown

    to

    (2) p is not knowable and an unknown p is not knowable.

    This inference is needed to reveal a contradiction in assuming that all truths are knowable and that there is an unknown truth.

    Not sure if this makes any sense, pg?
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  8. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Idea: Fitch's paradox of knowability   

    Is Fitch's paradox a threat to anti-realism?

    Fitch's paradox is an epistemic paradox and not a logical paradox.

    (1) Anti-realism asserts the knowability principle (or the doctrine of verificationism) that all truths are knowable.
    (2) If all truths are knowable, then by Fitch's paradox, all truths are known.
    (3) It is false that all truths are known.
    (4) Anti-realism is mistaken.

    See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitch-paradox/
    http://consequently.org/papers/notevery.pdf
    http://sites.google.com/site/knowability/home
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  9. Rexia Bytheweil added a topic in Explore   

    Idea: Fitch's paradox of knowability
    Some philosophers claim that it is possible to argue from simple premises that anti-realism positions which adhere to the knowability principle are mistaken. The knowability principle holds that "p (p →
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  10. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Help: minimalism, truth, and causal inferences   

    Hello

    I
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  11. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic How did you get here?   

    It was a series of events, where one followed another.
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  12. Rexia Bytheweil added a topic in Explore   

    Help: minimalism, truth, and causal inferences
    Recently, I was thinking about the question, what is minimalism about truth and how do we come to know about it? To become acquainted with minimalism about truth is to find out, under what circumstances there can be a regularity of meetings between the conditions for truth with the conditions for an optimal account of truth. The conditions for truth are concerned with the general requirements for truth, while the conditions for an optimal account of truth are concerned with the methodological requirements for truth.

    Regularity of meeting between the general conditions and the methodological conditions for truth is needed for knowledge of minimalism about truth. Without the meeting of these conditions, there can be no satisfactory account of truth. In other words, there is no doubt that a satisfactory account of truth is dependent on, though not entirely determined by the meeting of the general and methodological conditions for truth. To reiterate, if there is to be descriptive knowledge of minimalism, a reflective and balanced equilibrium between the general conditions and the methodological conditions for truth needs to occur.

    Regularity of meeting is not necessity of meeting, since, it is not necessary that there is a meeting between the general and methodological conditions for truth, but regularity of meeting is a necessary condition for there to be knowledge of minimalism about truth, which is what we are concerned with. Without regularity of meeting, this is not to say that there cannot be truth, but that some other way must be found to bridge the gap between factors which are ingredients for truth and factors which are considerations for what yields a focused and minimal account of truth.

    If there is to be descriptive knowledge of minimalism, an introduction to the fundamental tenets of minimalism is needed. Acquaintance with the fundamental provides knowledge of the workings of a foundation on which minimalism is built. Repetition of the fundamental tenets is required at the beginning, though repetition of the structural patterns of knowledge regarding minimalism is not. If the introductory process is slow to begin with, we should try to keep optimistic. It is not to say that no knowledge of minimalism about truth is possible.

    Minimalist theories of truth hold that truth can be described in terms of the schema 'p' iff p. Truth is cast in terms of the relationship between sentences and states of affairs. The family of minimalist theories is minimalist, because, it takes sentences, rather than propositions as the particular entities that are true.

    If sentences are taken as the bearers of truth, this is independent of whether sentences are the bearers of meaning. Sentences are the bearers of meaning, because, messages cannot be understood unless within the context of a sentence, but this is not to say that there cannot be truth unless it is sentences which are the entities capable of truth and falsity.

    If sentences are taken as the bearers of truth, this is also independent of whether correspondence is a necessary or sufficient condition for truth. The sentence
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  13. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Introduce yourself here...   

    It could also be
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  14. Rexia Bytheweil added a post in a topic Introduce yourself here...   

    Hello... I'm interested in philosophy but the seminars at university don't seem to go deep enough. So, I'm looking around for like-minded compatriots who would like to have further discussions on various topics in philosophy.
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