There's a long Reddit discussion of this here, with an interesting take on the Others. Do you think Martin (or the TV series) will follow your argument all the way to the end or instead end up favouring one or more characters (for example, Tyrion)?
I read that Brady was hit more times (20, I think) than any other quarterback since 2006. That's on the O line and no one could expect to put together any kind of offense in those conditions. Still, if the extra point had not been missed, the game would've gone to overtime with the momentum with the Patriots, so I'm not sure if this amounts to being out-coached. Manning missed open throws all day and should've put the game beyond New England; that would be my concern if I was a Denver fan who had just seen the Panthers put 49 on the second-best team in the league this year.
I am similarly cynical of resolutions, but last year I worked so many hours that this year I am determined to make more time to pursue other things. I am going to take up an evening class and book days off for research and writing up, plus spend more time at home. I did have a plan to stop getting up at 0500 to find space for exercise, but that already failed in week one.
I assume you have in mind here some form of dual duty: to not be a burden on others if this can be avoided, as well as to contribute to achieving a better state rather than moving to another. Like Michael, though, I am not sure what the imperative could be to have to do either. To take the latter first: suppose, for example, that I have dual nationality. I may decide that I prefer to live in B rather than A, so I move to B. Since I have the legal right to do so, I doubt that anyone would claim that I ought to stay in A to contribute to social or other problems rather than give up on them and move to B where I can of course do the same. Even if I stay in A and have no legal status in B, it would not follow that I am obliged to address social ills unless there exists some imperative to do so, regardless of problems elsewhere. Perhaps we could argue that such an imperative always exists by virtue of being a citizen, but we can probably agree that not everyone acts in accordance with this. In that case, why should we hold the refugee to a different standard? What changes if A is Syria and I am at risk of death if I stay? I probably have no legal right to move to B, but this lack is typically an accident of birth rather than a moral shortcoming. If I should stay in Syria and fight, why should everyone not stay where they were born and work to improve their community? This hypothetical imperative probably holds at a micro level also: why should I be allowed to leave the village of my birth to pursue opportunities in a city rather than stay to contribute to the development of the village? On the former implied duty, this seems to rest on an empirical case: if I am a net contributor to my new home, I am not being a burden. I think it is fair to say that immigrants are standardly held to be net contributors from the available research, so the threat is instead couched in terms of the potential dilution of national (or even local) identity and the overwhelming of social services by refugees who do not eventually become citizens. On this view, though, the latter is addressed by the net contribution, so the problem is with identity. However, identity is fluid and, in the earlier hypothetical case, no one questions my having a dual identity and taking the legally guaranteed opportunity to develop one at the expense of the other. We can perhaps say that this works at an individual level, but that too many people moving at the same time will threaten the stability of the identity at question; yet it is difficult to see why this concern outweighs, say, the threat to life that a refugee faces. More importantly, I think we use identity as a means of delegitimising the movement of people, so that immigration to the US from Ireland due to famine is culturally enriching in a way that the movement of Syrians somehow cannot be.
It seems to me that you are pointing towards Habermas's distinction between strategic action and communicative action, or else I am minded to think that - given Angela's initial reference to Habermas - she read you that way. The stereotype is a shortcut to success, in the sense of the strategic focus on achieving this regardless of the development of understanding, whereas a communicative act is supposed to result in understanding and rely on mutuality of (communicative) intent. The problem with pointing to Lydon's writing as 'more mind-opening' is that it is not obvious why his intent is communicative rather than strategic, unless we beg the question or assume that there is some correlation between clarity of writing and purity of aims. It is not really analogous, but if we think of Galileo using Italian (Tuscan) instead of Latin to appeal to a wider audience, we could say that this was a strategic act dressed up as a communicative one, or else that it was actually both. This is then why the appeal to Lydon is too simplistic, I think.
The defense is just hopeless. Unless something changes, the Saints can only win shoot-outs in which the opposition can't stop Brees. At this rate, the Panthers will stomp all over them (again) and I will need a Carolina t-shirt for the game.
It'll be interesting to see how the Patriots try to account for the Denver defense later in the season. Maybe the Giants and Saints could start by realising that football actually involves defense at all?