This site is supported by Nobility Studios.
Sign in to follow this  
Followers 0

Cuneo and Moral Authoritativeness

3 posts in this topic

Posted (edited)

(I'm at work- the wolves are at the door, so this entry shall be posted with the utmost quickness)

One of the more interesting features of last evenings presentation and discussion was the problem of "authoritativeness." Roughly- supposing that there are moral facts that are not contingent on pro-attitudes, subjective goals, etc, that they are, in a word, mind independent, why should we think that said facts have primacy? What explains this?

I brought up, in conversation with Cuneo, Frankfurt's "The Reasons of Love" in which Frankfurt flatly denies the authoritativeness of morality. Cuneo agreed that the longstanding working supposition of ethical philosophy, namely, that "if" moral realism is correct, moral facts have normative primacy, is problematic.

One of the musings offered by him, and he was extremely tentative, I thought interesting: He doesn't think that the Euthyphro dilemma is problematic, in short, opting to suppose that moral facts (he says "principles") are abstract facts that obtain irrespective of the existence of God, but that if God is the perfect exemplar of said facts, the authoritativeness of morality could be explained in the command(s) of God. (note, this is different than divine command theory).

Edited by DeadCanDance
1 person likes this

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Posted

I'm unclear why we should believe in moral Platonism.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Posted

I am unfamiliar with Cuneo, and, therefore, I am unfamiliar with what he might mean by "authoritativeness". Likewise, I do not have any idea what he imagines "moral facts" are like. If those (so-called) facts are general, or if they might be otherwise referred to as guidelines, then "moral Platonism" might not be the best description of Cuneo's "authoritativeness".

In response to DCD's previous thread, Authority and Power, I put forth some remarks about the nature of authority which might be relevant to whatever Cuneo had to say. For the context of that previous thread, the remarks were cast in terms of persons/personal, and a theist would certainly refer to the God mentioned by Cuneo in terms of person/personal; however, absent that feature, the authoritativeness could certainly recommend thinking of it as predominantly transcendent, but I do not think that thinking in terms of the transcendent is necessarily identical to Platonism - even if Cuneo subscribes to a type of Platonism.

Regardless, there is likely no inescapable argument for assigning a "should" to belief in a transcendent quality; that belief could arise from a wish to explain (even to one's own self) an experience or insight, or that belief could arise as a product of an exercise in seeking to resolve (or come closer to resolving) some intellectual problems.

Michael

2 people like this

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!


Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.


Sign In Now
Sign in to follow this  
Followers 0